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REPORTS OF CASES 
DETERMINED IN 
THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
[41 C.2d 1; 256 P.2d 984] 
[L.A. No. 22087. In Bank. May 8, 1953.] 
Estate of ARTHUR C. JAMISON, Deceased. CHANCEY 
B. JAMISON, Respondent, v. FRANCES JAMISON 
JOHNSON, as Guardian etc., et al., Appellants. 
[1] Appeal-Decisions Appealable-Nonsuit.-Ordinarily a judg-
ment of nonsuit is on the merits (Code Civ. Proc., § 581c), is 
considered a final disposition of the case, and is appealable. 
[2] Wills-Contest-Nonsuit.-A nonsuit as to some of the grounds 
of a will contest does not dispose of the whole case but only 
disposes of a portion of it, and thus there is the possibility of 
two judgments in the same case (the one of nonsuit and the 
other of a judgment at the close of the case on issues as to which 
a nonsuit was denied), while the general rule is that there 
should be only one judgment. 
[3] Dismissal-Nonsuit-AppeaL-In reviewing a judgment of non-
suit, the test applied by the appellate court is whether, accord-
ing to plaintiff the benefit of all favorable evidence together 
with inferences therefrom it is sufficient to make a case, 
whereas if the trial court sitting without a jury passes on the 
weight of the evidence, even though the only evidence produced 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, §§ 39, 50; Am.Jur., Appeal 
and Error, § 82. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 44; [2, 4, 5, 13] 
Wills, § 512(1); [3] Dismissal, § 81(2); [6] Wills, § 118(1); [7] 
Wills,§ 133; [8] Wills,§ 512(2); [9, 10] Wills,§ 109; [11] Wills, 
§ 136; [12] Wills,§ 117; [14, 18] Wills,§ 76; [15] Wills,§ 63; [16] 
Wills,§ 72; [17] Wills,§ 31; [19] Wills, § 541; [20, 21] Wills,§ 566. 
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lw that of plaintiff, and judgnwnt for dAfendant, the rule 
on reviPw is that the PvidPn<:'P must bP viPwPd most faYorably 
to defendant. 
i:4] Wills-Contest-Nonsuit.---Jn a will contest tried before a jury 
the proper procedure, rather than gTanting a motion for non-
suit on some of the grounds of contest, is for the court to in-
struct the jury to find for proponent on the issues on which 
it thinks a nonsuit would be proper. 
[5] Id.-Contest-Nonsuit.-Where the grounds of contest of pro-
bate of a holographic will were (1) that the will was not 
written and signed by decedent, (2) that it was executed under 
the undue influence of proponent, and (3) that decedent was 
mentally incompetent to execute it, and at the close of con-
testants' case proponent moved for a nonsuit on each and all 
of the grounds of contest, and the court granted the motion 
as to the first two grounds and denied it as to the third, and 
then, after making a finding that decedent had the mental 
capacity to execute the will but without making any finding 
on the issue of undue influence, stated in its judgment that 
decedent was not acting under undue influence, what was done 
should not be considered as a true nonsuit but rather as a sub-
mission by proponent of question whether contestants' evi-
dence was sufficient, and as a determination by the court that 
it was not sufficient. 
[6] Id.- Undue Influence- Activity of Beneficiary.- Although 
many factors, such as that decedent was estranged from a son 
and that son received much more under a holographic will 
executed shortly before decedent's death than he did under a 
prior witnessed will, have a bearing on issue of undue in-
fluence, they are insufficient in themselves to establish such 
influence; the son must also have been active in procuring the 
execution of the will. 
[7] !d.-Undue Influence-Circumstantial Evidence.-Activity of 
proponent in procuring execution of will may be established 
by inference, that is, circumstantial evidence. 
[8] Id.-Contest-Nonsuit.-On review of that portion of judgment 
in will contest which states that decedent was not acting under 
undue influence and which is guided by same principles as per-
taining in a nonsuit, that portion of proponent's testimony as 
to delivery of will to him by decedent which is favorable to 
contestants must be accepted and that which is unfavorable 
rejected. 
[9] Id.- Undue Influence- Confidential Relations.- While con-
sanguinity of itself does not create a fiduciary relationship as 
a factor bearing on issue of undue influence, it is some evidence 
of a fiduciary relationship. 
[6] See Cal.Jur., Wills, § 76 et seq.; Am.Jur., Wills, § 390 et seq. 
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[10] Id.- Undue Influence- Confidential Relations.- Although 
there is evidence that decedent and his son, the principal 
beneficiary in his will, had been estranged, where there is also 
evidence that after decedent became ill and for several months 
thereafter the son conscientiously visited his father, who 
thought he was a good son and liked him, discussed his affairs 
with him, and gave him papers dealing with finances to 
examine, it could be inferred from the father and son rela-
tionship and such evidence that a confidential relationship 
existed. 
[11] !d.-Undue Influence-Review of Evidence on AppeaL-Al-
though there is conflict in the evidence concerning many of the 
circumstances relied on to show undue influence of proponent in 
procuring execution of will, such conflict must be disregarded 
on appeal where the sole question is whether the evidence most 
favorable to contestants was sufficient as a matter of law to 
establish undue influence. 
[12] Id.- Undue Influence- Activity of Beneficiary.-Where a 
fiduciary relationship is combined with unduly profiting by a 
will, its being unnatural, and activity on part of proponent 
in procuring its execution, there is persuasive evidence of un-
due influence. 
[13] Id.-Contest-Nonsuit.-Where there is sufficient evidence on 
the issue of undue influence to support a finding in favor of 
contestants of will, a judgment of nonsuit on this issue will be 
reversed. 
[14] !d.-Testamentary Capacity-Review of Evidence.-If there 
is any substantial evidence to support a finding that testator 
was of sound mind and competent to make a will, it cannot be 
disturbed even though there is a sharp conflict and abundant 
evidence to support a contrary conclusion. 
[15] !d.-Testamentary Capacity-Presumptions and Burden of 
Proof.-A testator is presumed to have been sane or of 
sound mind, and the burden of overcoming this presumption is 
on the contestants. 
[16] Id. - Testamentary Capacity- Opinion of Physician.-The 
opinion of doctors who attended decedent in his last illness 
that he was suffering from senile dementia and thus was of 
unsound mind when his will was made is not conclusive on 
the issue of competency. 
[17] !d.-Testamentary Capacity-Adjudication of Incompetency. 
-Incompetency to make a will is not necessarily established by 
the fact that decedent was adjudged incompetent in a guardian-
ship proceeding. 
[16] See Cal.Jur., Wills, § 5 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 1211. 
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[18] !d.-Testamentary Capacity-Review of Evidence.-Where 
conflict in evidence as to competency of testator to make a 
will was resolved by trial court which weighed the evidence, its 
conclusion is binding on appeal. 
[19] Id.-Contest-Judgment.-A judgment in a will contest be-
fore probate stating· that the will is "entitled to be admitted 
to probate" substantially complies with Prob. Code, § 373, 
which provides that on proof taken by the court where a 
jury is waived in such contest the court must render "judg-
ment either admitting the will to probate or rejecting it," 
since nothing remains to be done. 
[20] Id.-Costs.-Prob. Code, § 1232, declaring that "When not 
otherwise prescribed ... either the superior court or the 
court on appeal, may, in its discretion, order costs to be paid 
by any party to the proceedings, or out of the assets of the 
estate, as justice may require," applies to will contests before 
probate. 
[21] Id.-Costs.-Court should not award costs in a will contest 
until final determination of the contest, and hence should not 
make an award where an appeal is taken. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County declaring that a holographic will was entitled 
to be admitted to probate. John Gee Clark, Judge. Affirmed 
insofar as judgment determined decedent was competent 
when will was made, and reversed with directions insofar as 
judgment determined that there was no undue influence; por-
tion of judgment allowing costs, reversed. 
Frederick W. Mahl, Jr., Edward Alton, Frank M. Sturgis 
and Allan F. Bullard for Appellants. 
Church, Church & Howard and Charles H. Church for Re-
spondent. 
CARTER, J.-Chance Jamison, respondent here, petitioned 
for probate of the holographic will,* dated December 31, 1949, 
of Arthur C. Jamison, his father. California Trust Com-
*''Dec 31-49 
''I hereby revoke all past wills-codicils by me made-declare this 
is my last will-I give H all my properties to my four heirs as follows-
Lea Patterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2% 
Frances Johnson ................................. 5% 
Chance Jamison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85% 
Louise Jamison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8% 
''I appoint Chance Jamison as Executor of my will without bond 
A. C. Jamison" 
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pany petitioned for the probate of a witnessed will of the 
decedent, dated May 17, 1948. Frances Johnson, decedent's 
daughter, for herself and her two minor children; Leanore 
Patterson, another daughter of the decedent, her children., and 
Katharine Jamison, the divorced wife of respondent, :filed op-
positions to the probate of the holographic will. Louise Jami-
son, surviving widow of decedent, did not oppose it. Under 
the 1948 will, decedent had left $5,000 to each of his two 
daughters, to respondent, his son, and to his brother Roy; 
$15,000 to his wife, Louise; $50,000 to Katharine Jamison; 
and the residue to his grandchildren. In the 1949, or holo-
graphic will, supra, he left 2 per cent of his estate to his 
daughter, Leanore Patterson, 5 per cent to his daughter 
Frances Johnson, 8 per cent to his wife Louise and the bal-
ance of 85 per cent to respondent, his son. The 1949 will re-
voked previous wills. Decedent left an estate of a stipulated 
value of $237,000. 
The grounds of contest of the probate of the holographic 
will were: (1) That it was not written and signed by decedent; 
(2) that it was executed under the undue influence of re-
spondent; and (3) that the decedent was mentally incompetent 
to execute it. Contestants abandoned the first ground on this 
appeal, leaving only the last two. The case ,was tried by the 
court without a jury. 
At the close of contestants' case, respondent moved for a 
nonsuit on each and all of the grounds of contest. The court 
granted the motion as to the first two grounds and denied it as 
to the third, mental capacity. The judgment at the close of 
the case concluded that decedent had executed the 1949 will, 
having the mental capacity to do so, had not then acted under 
undue influence, and that the will was entitled to probate. 
Contestants appeal from that judgment. 
[1] The propriety of granting a motion for a nonsuit as 
to some of the grounds of contest and denying it as to others 
is doubtful when we speak of nonsuit in its true meaning. 
That is so because ordinarily a judgment of nonsuit is on the 
merits (Code Civ. Proc., § 581c), is considered a final disposi-
tion of the case and is appealable. (3 Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal & 
Error, §§50, 39.) [2] A nonsuit as to some of the grounds 
of contest does not dispose of the whole case but only disposes 
of a portion of it. Thus there would be the possibility of two 
judgments in the same case (the one of nonsuit and another 
judgment at the close of the case on issues as to which a non-
suit had been denied) when the general rule is that there 
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shonld be only one judgment. (3 Cal..Jur.2d, Appeal & Error, 
§ 40.) This would raise the qner.:;tion of ~whether it would be 
necessary to appeal from the first judgment of nonsuit on 
some of the grounds of contest. [3] Further difficulties ap-
pear when we note that in reviewing a judgment of nonsuit, 
the test applied by the appellate court is whether, according 
to plaintiff (contestants) the benefit of all favorable evidence 
together with inferences therefrom, it is sufficient to make a 
ease, while if the trial court sitting without a jury, passes 
upon the weight of the evidence, even though the only evidence 
produced be that of plaintiff, and gives judgment for de-
fendant, the rule on review is that the evidence must be viewed 
most favorably to defendant. [4] In a case tried to a jury 
the proper procedure, rather than granting a motion for non-
suit on some of the grounds, would be for the court to instruct 
the jury to find for proponent on the issues upon which it 
thought a nonsuit would be proper. (See Estate of Hewitt, 
63 Cal.App. 440, 444 [218 P. 778] .) [5] What was done 
in the instant case should not be considered as a true nonsuit. 
Rather the respondent, proponent of the will, by his motion 
for a nonsuit, in effect said to the court, "I do not wish to 
put on any evidence to answer that produced by contestants 
for I do not think their evidence is sufficient as a matter of law 
to make a case on the first and second grounds and I am 
willing that the court decide these issues on that basis-as 
a matter of law, and refrain from weighing the evidence." 
rrhe finding·s of fact made after all the evidence was in, show 
that is what happened here because the trial court did not 
make a finding on the issue of undue influence, the second 
ground of contest, but, in its judgment, stated its conclusion 
that decedent was not acting under undue influence. We 
take that to mean that, as a matter of law, the court felt that 
the evidence on that issue was not sufficient; that it had not 
purported to weigh the evidence on that issue. Therefore on 
that issue the scope of review must be the same as that on 
a nonsuit, while on the finding of mental capacity the test 
is whether there was sufficient evidence to support the finding. 
Contestants' main contention is that the evidence when 
viewed most favorably to them is sufficient to establish undue 
influence and that the evidence is insufficient to support the 
finding of mental capacity. 
Turning first to the question of undue influence there is 
evidence from which the following appears: The testator died 
on February 11, 1950, at the age of 83, a month and 11 days 
May 1953] EsTATE OF JAMISON 
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after he made the 1949 holographic will. He had been mar-
ried twice, his first wife having predeceased him. He left, 
surviving him, his second wife, Louise; his son, respondent 
here, and his wife, Esther; Katharine Johnson, divorced wife 
of respondent, and Jeanne, their daughter; Leanore Patterson, 
another daughter, and her four children, Jean, Patricia, Vir-
ginia and Robert; Frances Johnson, another daughter, and 
her two children, Pranklin and Jacqueline ; Clare and Roy 
Jamison, his brothers. 
The testator had not been actively engaged in business 
since 1930, except as to the investment of his money. He had 
been well until the onset of the illness in May, 1949, which 
culminated in his death. He was a family man and took an 
active interest in his children and grandchildren. His first 
wife died in 1945, and he married his surviving widow in 
1948. Respondent and his father, the decedent, had been 
estranged for many years, the latter being displeased with 
the way his son conducted his life and felt that he was ''no 
good.'' The testator had been a person of strong character 
tending toward domination as the head of his clan. At the 
onset of his last illness, he had adamantly maintained that 
he would not go to a hospital and had remained at home for 
a week. After he entered the hospital on May 20, 1949, he 
became "docile." At the hospital he had a daily fever, his 
gall bladder was diseased, he was anemic, and a heart ail-
ment required medication and oxygen. He was suffering 
from arteriosclerosis and senile dementia. He was mentally 
confused and showed it in his actions. He could not add fig-
ures, indicating, contestants assert, that he could not have 
computed the percentages in the holographic will. His per-
sonal physician testified that he was of unsound mind on 
December 31, 1949, the date of the holographic will. He left 
the hospital and returned to his home where he remained 
until his death on February 11, 1950, still suffering from his 
various ailments and under constant nursing care. 
[6] There is thus a showing that decedent was in such 
a mental condition on December 31, 1949, when the will was 
purportedly executed, that he would be easily influenced; that 
being estranged from respondent, his son, and being fond 
of his grandchildren and daughters and his son's first wife, 
it would not be probable that he would leave most of his 
estate to respondent. There were aspects of unnaturalness 
and undue profiting by respondent under the 1949 will, by 
which he received much more than he did under the 1948 
8 EsTATE oF JAMISON [41 C.2d 
will. 'l'hese are all factors bearing upon the issue of undue 
influence. (Estate of Teel, 25 Cal.2d 520 [154 P.2d 384] ; 
Estate of Lingenfelter, 38 Cal.2d 571 [241 P.2d 990] .) Of 
course, standing alone, these factors are insufficient to estab-
lish undue influence. The proponent must also be active in 
procuring the execution of the will. (Estate of Teel, supra, 
25 Cal.2d 520; Estate of Lingenfelter, supra, 38 Cal.2d 571.) 
[7] Such activity may be established by inference, that is, 
circumstantial evidence. (Estate of Abert, 91 Cal.App.2d 
50 [204 P.2d 347] ; Estate of Hannam, 106 Cal.App.2d 782 
[236 P.2d 208] ; Estate of Leahy, 5 Cal.2d 301 [54 P.2d 704] ; 
Estate of Sproston, 4 Cal.2d 717 [52 P.2d 924]; Estate of 
Kilborn, 162 Cal. 4 [120 P. 762]; In re McDevitt, 95 Cal. 17 
[30 P. 101]; see cases collected 26 Cal.Jur. 760-761.) 
[8] In the instant case, according to respondent's testi-
mony under section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the 
will which was dated December 31, 1949, was handed to him 
by decedent on February 7, 1950, 38 days after its date and 
4 days before his death. This occurrence took place in de-
cedent's home while respondent was visiting him, although 
the decedent did not say, and respondent did not know, that 
what was handed to him was a will. Decedent said he did not 
have long to live, handed him the will and cautioned re-
spondent not to show it to anyone. Respondent did not know 
when the will was executed. On this review, guided by the 
same principles as pertaining in a nonsuit, the portion of 
such testimony favorable to contestants must be accepted and 
that which is unfavorable rejected. The fact remains that 
when the testator died, respondent had possession of the will 
and offered it for probate. 
There is evidence that respondent had an interest or motive 
in having a will executed which would give him the major 
share of the estate and that he had the opportunity to exercise 
undue influence. In connection with the matter of oppor-
tunity, it appears, according to respondent's testimony, that 
he visited his father frequently when he was ill in the hospital, 
made almost daily visits after he had returned home and that 
he was with his father several hours on December 31, 1949, 
the date of the will, a part of which time he was with his 
father alone. 
In addition to the foregoing, contestants point to other 
circumstances shown by the evidence: that decedent had a 
great regard for his grandchildren, respondent's divorced wife, 
and his children, with the exception of respondent, who he 
May 1953] EsTATE OF JAMISON 
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felt was "no good"-no son of his. (Decedent left respondent 
$5,000 by the 1948 will as compared with 85 per cent of his 
estate by the 1949 will which made no provision for his 
grandchildren or respondent's divorced wife.) In May, 1949, 
]'ranees Johnson, respondent's sister, told him that he was 
to receive $5,000 under the 1948 will and his divorced wife 
was to get $50,000. Later he was similarly advised and he 
stated he was going to break the will. About August 1, 1949, 
Frances and respondent were in Attorney Arkoff's office dis-
cussing the matter of having Frances appointed guardian of 
decedent's estate and the testamentary disposition of his 
property. Arkoff said decedent could make a will even though 
a guardian was appointed and he explained how a holographic 
will was made and executed. From this it may be inferred 
that respondent was inquiring about that kind of a will al-
though he had said he was not there to discuss wills. Re-
spondent spoke to the testator and others about the testator's 
making a new will (different from the 1948 will). On two 
occasions, once while decedent was in the hospital, and once 
when he was at home (September, 1949), respondent handed a 
will in his own handwriting to his father for his signature. 
This proposed will bequeathed the estate to decedent's three 
children and revoked all previous wills. When it was 
handed to decedent he said he would see about it and laid it 
aside. Respondent then replaced it in his pocket. As above 
seen, respondent was a constant visitor to his father after 
his illness although they had previously been estranged. Re-
spondent's second wife had formerly been a legal secretary, 
and secretary to Giannini of the Bank of America, where she 
may have acquired some legal knowledge. As far as appears, 
respondent was the only person w'ho knew of the 1949 will 
until after decedent's death. After his father's death, re-
spondent had the bank's representative show him the 1948 will 
without divulging his possession· of the 1949 will. Later he 
delivered the 1949 will to his attorney. From this, it is as-
serted, that it may be inferred he was afraid to use the 1949 
will because he knew it was invalid and would not have done 
so if he had found the 1948 will to be favorable to him. 
Contestants point out that the will is so concise and legally 
complete that it is unreasonable to believe that the testator, 
in his weakened condition, could have prepared it of his own 
volition; that he was mentally incapable of listing the per-
centage each legatee would receive so that the various per-
centages would total 100 per cent, or his entire estate. Also, 
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the appearance of the in the will itself shows it must 
have bet>n a laborious ta::.;k for the writer. 
li'inally it iR claimrd tlmt the between testator 
and respondent, that of father aml son, is a fiduciary rela-
tionship which is a factor in the question of undue influence, 
citing Estate of Eakle, 33 Cal.App.2d 379 [91 P.2d 954]. 
To that case may be added Robins v. Hope, 57 Cal. 493, 497 
and Baeon v. Soule, 19 Cal.App. 428, 434 [126 P. 384]. 
[9] However, this court said in Estate Lingenfelter, supra, 
38 Cal.2d 585 : ''Consanguinity of itself does not create 
a fiduciary relationship." It however, some evidence of a 
fiduciary relationship. (Estate of Llewellyn, 83 Cal.App.2d 
534, 562 [189 P.2d 822, 191 P.2d 419] .) [10] While there is 
evidence that respondent and his father had been estranged, 
there is also evidence that after his father became ill and 
for several months thereafter he had conscientiously visited 
his father. The decedent thought he was a good son and 
liked him, discussed his affairs with him and gave him papers 
dealing with finances to examine. From the father and son 
relationship and that evidence it could be inferred that a 
confidential relationship existed. 
[11] There is conflict in the evidence concerning many of 
the foregoing circumstances as well as in the inferences 
which may be drawn from them but, as seen, the sole question 
is whether the evidence most favorable to contestants was 
sufficient as a matter of law to establish undue influence, and 
the conflicts must, therefore, be disregarded. 
[12] The general rule is as stated in Estate of Teel, supra, 
25 Cal.2d 520, 528: '' ... where such fiduciary relationship is 
combined with unduly profiting by the will, and its being un-
natural, and activity on the part of the proponent in procuring 
its execution, we have persuasive evidence of undue influ-
ence.'' 
While generally it is not fruitful to compare factually other 
will contest cases because of the variation in existence and 
degree of the factors involved, nevertheless Estate of De La-
veaga, 165 Cal. 607 [133 P. 307] is quite persuasive. There 
the testatrix was of weak mind (retarded development), had 
lived for many years with her sister and her sister's husband 
who had made all of her decisions for her. It was there held 
that the relationship was a fiduciary one. The will there in-
volved was holographic and precise in its form. The testatrix 
left the bulk of her estate to her sister and only a small share 
to her brother who contested it. According to the testimony 
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of the sister-proponent, and her husband, on the date of the 
will, the testatrix called them to her room and showed them 
the will which she said she had written. The testatrix signed 
it in their presence and handed it to the sister who kept it 
until testatrix' death. The sister testified that they had exer-
cised no influence. The probate court found in favor of the 
contestant on the grounds of unsoundness of mind and undue 
influence. This court affirmed the probate court on both 
grounds, stating: ''The evidence is likewise amply sufficient 
to sustain the finding of undue influence. Of course there can 
be no claim that the evidence does not sufficiently show the 
relation of trust and confidence between the deceased and 
the Cebria1;1s, and the complete and perfect control of the 
deceased by them. There was certainly sufficient proof of 
interest and opportunity. The claim of learned counsel in this 
regard is that there was no proof that any undue influence 
was brought to bear directly upon the testamentary act. It 
is well settled that 'undue influence, ... must in order to 
avoid a will destroy the free agency of the testator at the 
time and in the very act of the making of the testament. 
It must bear directly upon the testamentary act' (Estate of 
Higgins, 156 Cal. 261 [104 P. 8); 'there must be substantial 
proof of the pressure which overpowers the volition of the 
testator at the time the will was made.' (Estate of Ricks, 
160 Cal. 461-462 [117 P. 537] .) And to warrant the setting 
aside of a will on this ground there must of course be sub-
stantial evidence of the exercise of undue influence on the 
testamentary act. 'Substantial evidence must do more than 
raise suspicion. It must amount to proof, and such evidence 
has the force of proof only when circumstances are proved 
which are inconsistent with the claim that the will was the 
spontaneous act of the alleged testator.' (Estate of Ricks, 
160 Cal. 462 [117 P. 537].) And it is said that the only 
evidence as to the execution of this will was that given by 
Mr. and Mrs. Cebrian, and that this evidence shows without 
conflict that there was nothing in the way of influence, undue 
or otherwise, attempted to be exerted upon deceased in the 
matter. But the court was not bound to accept as true the 
testimony of the Cebrians in this regard. If it was sufficiently 
made to appear that the deceased was absolutely incompetent 
to understandingly and intelligently consider her property 
with a view to its proper disposition, and alone and unaided 
to compose and write the paper offered for probate as her 
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will, to warrant the trial judge in so concluding, as we have 
seen is the fact, we have substantial proof of undue influence 
bearing directly upon the testamentary act; and in view of 
the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Cebrian that they were the 
only persons present at the time of the execution of the will, 
taken in connection with the other matters to which we have 
referred, it is certainly a reasonable, if indeed not an irresist-
ible, inference, that whatever undue influence was in fact 
exerted, was exerted by one or the other or both of them. 
In addition to the matters already stated as being shown by 
sufficient evidence, it is proper to note that the evidence 
shows that Mr. Cebrian was a man of education, and one with 
a considerable knowledge of law and legal forms; and also 
that the alleged will indicated on its face that insofar as the 
actual writing was concerned it was a laborious effort. As 
said by the learned trial judge : 'It is quite plainly the product 
of much manual exertion. If she was not following copy or 
taking dictation, she was certainly engaged in hard work in 
the writing of this will; it is not an example of fluency in pen-
manship nor of accuracy in spelling.' It is also proper to take 
into consideration the improbability that deceased if she was 
of sound and disposing mind and memory, and not acting 
under undue influence, would have so discriminated against 
her brother, who, in the language of the trial judge 'had been 
a great service to her for many years and who had conserved 
her estate without the diminution of a dollar, indeed with 
increase and without retaining anything for personal bene-
fit,' and of whom, as the evidence shows, she was very fond.'' 
(Estate of De Laveaga, snpra, 165 Cal. 607, 622.) [13] From 
the foregoing discussion and authorities it appears that there 
is sufficient evidence on the issue of undue influence to sup-
port a finding in favor of contestants and the judgment of 
nonsuit on this issue must, therefore, be reversed. 
On the issue of unsoundness of mind, there is testimony 
by many witnesses, including several doctors, who were at-
tending decedent, that the latter was of unsound mind and 
did not know of what his property consisted on the date (De-
cember 31, 1949) stated in the 1949 will and at other times 
near that date. A guardian was appointed for decedent in 
late July or August of 1949, on the ground that he was in-
competent to handle his affairs. The trial court found, never-
theless, that the testator was of sound mind and competent 
to make the will. 
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[14] If there is any substantial evidence to support that 
finding it cannot be disturbed even though there is a sharp 
conflict in the evidence and abundant evidence to support a 
contrary conclusion. (Estate of Bristol, 23 Cal.2d 221 [143 
P.2d 689]; Estate of Teel, supra, 25 Cal.2d 520.) [15] And 
there is a presumption that the testator was sane-of sound 
mind-which the contestants must overcome. (Estate of Lin-
genfelter, supra, 38 Cal.2d 571.) [16] The opinion of the 
doctors who attended decedent in his last illness that he was 
suffering from senile dementia and thus was of unsound mind 
when the will was made is not conclusive on the issue of 
competency. (Estate of McCollum, 59 Cal.App.2d 744 [140 
P.2d 176]; Arais v. Kalensnikojj, 10 Cal.2d 428 [74 P.2d 1043, 
115 A.L.R. 163] ; 20 Am.Jur., Evidence, § 1211; Estate of 
Sandman, 121 Cal.App. 9 [8 P.2d 499].) [17] Incompe-
tency to make a will is not necessarily established by the fact 
that decedent was adjudged an incompetent in a guardianship 
proceeding. (Hellman Commercial T. & S. Bank v. Alden, 
206 Cal. 592 [275 P. 794] ; Estate of Loveland, 162 Cal. 595 
[123 P. 801]; Estate of Johnson, 57 Cal. 529; Jensen v. Jensen, 
84 Cal.App.2d 754 [192 P.2d 55] ; see In re Zanetti, 34 Cal. 
2d 136 [208 P.2d 657].) 
[18] Opposed to contestants' evidence is the testimony 
of several witnesses, including the respondent, that testator 
was of sound mind on the date borne by the 1949 will and 
on prior and subsequent occasions. This testimony recounted 
the rational behavior of decedent and showed that he was in 
possession of his faculties. Also, the will itself bears mute 
evidence of testator's competency. The conflict was resolved 
by the trial· court which weighed the evidence and its con-
clusion is binding on this appeal. 
[19] Contestants contend that the judgment is erroneous 
in that it did not order the 1949 will admitted to probate. 
Section 373 of the Probate Code provides that in a will con-
test before probate upon proof taken by the court where a 
jury is waived, the court must render ''judgment either ad-
mitting the will to probate or rejecting it." Here the judg-
ment states that the 1949 will is ''entitled to be admitted to 
probate'' rather than that it is admitted to probate. On the 
same day, the court made an order admitting the will to pro-
bate. No appeal was taken from that order. On respondent's 
motion to dismiss the instant appeal, the District Court of 
Appeal held that an order admitting a will to probate is not 
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proper after judgment a contest before probate 
and that the should order the will admitted to pro-
bate but it reserved the as to the claimed error in 
the to be decided when the appeal was decided 
on the merits (Estate of Jamison, 107 Cal..App.2d 483 [237 
P.2d 546]). It is clear that the judgment substantially com-
plies with section 373 of the Probate Code. When it declared 
that the will was entitled to be admitted to probate nothing 
remained to be done. Although it could have been worded 
more precisely we find no substantial error. 
[20] Contestants assert the court erred in awarding costs 
to respondent, proponent of the 1949 will. The statute states: 
''When not otherwise prescribed by this code or by rules 
adopted by the Judicial Council, either the superior court or 
the court on appeal, may, in its discretion, order costs to be 
paid by any party to the proceedings, or out of the assets of 
the estate, as justice may require." (Prob. Code, § 1232.) That 
section applies to will contests before probate. (Estate of Jones, 
166 Cal. 147 [135 P. 293]; Estate of Bwmp, 152 Cal. 271 [92 
P. 642] .) [21] However, the court should not exercise its 
discretion and award costs until the final determination of the 
contest. Thus it should not make an award where an appeal 
is taken. (Estate of Hart, 107 Cal.App.2d 58 [236 P.2d 891]; 
Estate of Jones, supra, 166 Cal. 147; Estate of Berthol, 163 
Cal. 343 [125 P. 750] ; Henry v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. 569 
[29 P. 230]; Estate of Johnson, 198 Cal. 469 [245 P. 1089], 
200 Cal. 307 [252 P. 1052] ; Estate of Wallace, 12 Cal.2d 476, 
481 [86 P.2d 95] .) Here the contest is not ended for, as ap-
pears, there must be a new trial on the issue of undue in-
fluence. 
The judgment is affirmed insofar as it determines decedent 
was competent when the 1949 will was made. It is reversed 
insofar as it determines that there was no undue influence 
and remanded for a new trial on that issue. The portion 
allowing costs is reversed. 
Each party shall bear his own costs on this appeal. (See 
Hules on Appeal, rule 26 (a) . ) 
Gibson, C. ,T., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Schauer, J., con-
curred. 
EDMONDS, J.-Recently, this court reiterated the long 
established rule that '' ( t) o overturn a will on the ground of 
undue influence, not only must there be evidence of activity 
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on the part of the beneficiary, it also 'is necessary to show that 
the influence was such as, in effect, to destroy the testator's 
free ag·ency and substitute for his own another person's will. 
. . . Evidence must be produced that pressure was brought 
to bear directly upon the testamentary act ... mere oppor-
tunity to influence the mind of the testator, even though 
coupled with an interest or motive to do so, is not sufficient.' " 
(Estate of L1:ngenfelter, 38 Cal.2d 571, 586 [241 P.2d 990] .) 
The activity must be of such a nature that it "over-
powered the mind and bore down the volition of the testator 
at the very time the will was made." (Estate of Carithers, 156 
Cal. 422-428 [105 P. 130] .) Moreover, it must be proved 
by evidence in addition to that tending to establish such other 
factors as unnaturalness of the will, motive by the proponent, 
and susceptibility to influence on the part of the testator. As 
I read the record in the present case, there are no facts from 
which such conduct reasonably may be inferred. 
The evidence relied upon by the contestants as giving rise 
to such an inference shows only motive, unnaturalness in the 
will, or the testator's susceptibility to influence, factors which 
do not replace but are in addition to the requirement that the 
proponent's activity in procuring the will be shown. Other 
facts are mentioned in the majority opinion, but it is not 
held that they are sufficient to support an inference of activity 
which invalidates the testamentary document. Estate of De 
Laveaga, 165 Cal. 607 [133 P. 307], is said to be "quite 
persuasive'' of the conclusion reached but the facts of that 
case clearly distinguish it from the present situation. 
There, from childhood, the decedent had been incapable of 
carrying on her own business affairs, entrusting all of such 
matters to her brothers and sisters. Her sister, the proponent 
of the will, directed all of her activities, the decedent obeying 
without protest. Her mind was that of a child, "unable to 
eomprehend anything beyond the most simple matters." It 
was found specifically that she was incompetent mentally to 
execute a will. 
In addition, it was shown that the decedent had no knowl-
edge of the nature or value of her property, but the will was 
explicit in designating items and amounts. 'l'he proponent 
and her husband, who with others managed her business 
affairs, were alone with the decedent at the time the will was 
executed. 'l'here was evidence that she signed any and all 
papers which they presented to her, without inquiry as to 
their nature and effect, and ''she never indicated her ability 
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unaided to compose and write any paper beyond the simplest 
and most childish messages, the few writings of any other 
character shown, exclusive of the alleged will, having . been 
produced with great and laborious effort and under such cir-
cumstances as to indicate the aid and assistance of others.'' 
(P. 621.) 
Here, the evidence viewed most favorably to the contestants 
shows only the following facts : Prior to the execution of 
the will, Chance Jamison, each time in the presence of at 
least one other person, sought twice to have the testator 
revoke a previous will and execute a new one dividing the 
estate among the children. Chance knew how to prepare a 
holographic will. The mind of the testator was weak, but not to 
such an extent as to justify a finding of mental incompetency. 
The testator prepared a will which was concise and legally 
complete, the appearance of which "shows it must have been 
a laborious task for the writer.'' Chance and his wife visited 
the testator on the day the will was executed, being alone 
with him part of that time; the rest of the day he was either 
alone or in the company of various other persons, no evidence 
being offered as to the time of day the will was executed. 
The most that can be said for this evidence is that it shows 
a possible desire and opportunity to influence the testator to 
prepare a new will. But to say that from such evidence it 
may be found that the proponent ''overpowered the mind and 
bore down the volition of the testator at the very time the 
will was made'' is to permit the will to be overturned, not 
upon proof, but upon speculation. 
I would affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
Spence, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied June 4, 
1953. Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
